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ABSTRACT
Local opposition to infrastructure projects that implement renewable energy 
(RE), such as wind farms, is often strong even if state-wide support for RE 
is strikingly high. The slogan ‘Not In My Backyard’ (NIMBY) has become 
synonymous for this kind of protest. This paper revisits the question of what 
might be wrong with those who are NIMBYs about RE projects, and how best 
to address them. I will argue that local opponents to wind farm (and other RE) 
developments do not necessarily fail to contribute their fair share to produc-
ing a desirable public good (clean energy). In fact, with landscape concerns 
being at the heart of much protest, the question of fair burden distribution 
becomes sidelined: landscape impacts cannot be distributed nor compensated 
for. Protests may be attempts to express a true conflict of (incommensurable) 
values. Understanding them as such will help us better address NIMBY con-
cerns and overcome such opposition through ensuring procedural justice.
KEYWORDS
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INTRODUCTION
A frequent phenomenon with regard to renewable energy (RE) infrastructure 
projects such as wind farms is that local opposition is strong even if state-wide 
support is strikingly high. In the UK, for example, public support for wind en-
ergy is at eighty per cent, but only twenty-five per cent of wind power capacity 
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is commissioned (Bell et al., 2005: 460). This would suggest that opposition to 
RE projects such as wind turbines is, by and large, not motivated by objections 
to wind energy or renewable energy as such. Rather, local resistance regularly 
focuses on the specific project proposed, with protesters preferring RE plants 
not to be built in their backyard. Many of those who oppose local renewable 
energy projects seem to do so because these would be built in their vicinity, or 
virtually in their backyard. The slogan ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) has be-
come synonymous with local communities’ resistance to such developments.
For the purpose of this paper, I take the term NIMBY to encompass all those 
protesters against infrastructure projects (X) whose first preference out of a set 
of preferences is that a particular project be realized, but not in their immediate 
vicinity (metaphorically speaking, their ‘backyard’). The term NIMBY, as I 
use it here, includes both ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ NIMBYs:
Table 1. Preferences of NIMBYs.1
1st preference: X is built, but not in my backyard.
Strong NIMBY1 Weak NIMBY
2nd preference: X is not built at all. X is built in my backyard.
3rd preference: X is built in my backyard X is not built at all.
While there may be protesters who reject a project in question altogether, that 
is, wherever it is built – as is the case with many protesters against nuclear 
power – the term ‘NIMBY’ is normally reserved for those who do not reject a 
project as such, but only oppose its realization in their vicinity.2 It will usually 
not be possible to determine whether a particular NIMBY is of the strong or 
the weak kind, so I will not focus on this distinction here. For my purposes, a 
NIMBY is someone who leads or participates in campaigns aimed at prevent-
ing particular infrastructure construction projects in their vicinity, including 
RE projects. The immediate and central aim of NIMBY campaigns is to pre-
vent such projects from going ahead.
This paper revisits the question of what might be wrong with those who 
are NIMBYs about RE projects, with a view to successfully addressing their 
1. This definition is similar to Feldman and Turner’s definition of ‘genuine’ NIMBYs in their 
2010 paper, and identical to the one they use in their 2014 paper. They do not cover ‘weak’ 
NIMBYs, in contrast to Crozier and Hajzler (2010), who seem to cover only ‘weak’ NIMBYs. 
I think it is important to include both sub-types, seeing that their (shared) first preference is 
the most characteristic feature of NIMBYs.
2. See, for instance, Hermansson: ‘NIMBY is described as opposition against something one 
believes to be good for society at large: something that one would not like to be without, like 
railways and rehabilitation centres’ (2007: 25).
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concerns while implementing a clean energy regime.3 The first two sections 
discuss different ways of construing the wrongness of NIMBYs, showing that 
it is not clear that we are faced with a type of prisoner’s dilemma, that they are 
free-riders on a public good, or that they necessarily fail to contribute their fair 
share to a collective endeavour. The upshot of Section Two will be that some 
of the burdens imposed on local residents – landscape impacts – simply can-
not be distributed nor compensated for. Section Three suggests that protesters 
might be attempting to express a conflict between incommensurable values, 
and it proposes a variety of ways to address such conflicts. The upshot of the 
discussion is that such value conflicts are best resolved through stakeholder 
engagement and adhering to good standards of procedural justice.
1. NIMBYS, FREE-RIDING AND PRISONER’S DILEMMAS4
Frequently, NIMBYs are regarded as unfair and selfish; this is especially the 
case where there is a strong consensus about the general societal importance of 
the developments in question, as is often the case with RE projects. Derek Bell 
et al. have argued that NIMBYs’ opposition to infrastructure projects that the 
general public – in principle – approve of, such as wind farms, reflects a par-
ticular kind of collective-action problem. They argue that opposition to wind 
farms is individually rational while it is collectively rational to have renewable 
energy:
In a multi-person prisoner’s dilemma it is collectively rational for the public 
good (wind energy) to be produced, but it is individually rational for each in-
dividual to ‘free-ride’ on the contributions of others (not have wind energy in 
their area). The individual’s contribution to the public good (a few megawatts 
of wind energy from the local wind farm) is negligible, while the cost of making 
that contribution may be considerable. (2005: 465)5
Bell et al. characterise NIMBYs as akin to defecting agents in a prisoner’s 
dilemma and as free-riders. Is NIMBYism a kind of prisoner’s dilemma? Here 
is the pay-off matrix for a two-person prisoner’s dilemma game where T > R 
> P > S.
3. I use ‘clean’ energy and ‘renewable’ energy synonymously here, though there are some 
non-renewable technologies that are usually counted as ‘clean’, such as carbon capture and 
storage. My use of ‘clean’ energy does not include these fossil-fuel based technologies, but 
only energy from renewable sources such as wind and solar.
4. I am grateful to David Butler for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this section.
5. See also the discussion in Hermansson (2007: 24ff.).
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Table 2. Pay-off matrix.
Player 2 co-operates Player 2 defects
Player 1 co-operates Reward/Reward
R/R
Sucker/Temptation
S/T
Player 1 defects Temptation/Sucker
T/S
Punishment/Punishment
P/P
Both the weak and the strong NIMBY prefer that wind farms be built, but they 
prefer not to contribute to the good of renewable energy. Let us use a massively 
simplified scenario where in order to provide a political community X with 
clean energy, two wind farms have to be built. X consists of only two towns, 
our two ‘players’ in this game. Either both towns have one wind farm each in 
their vicinity, or one town hosts both wind farms, or neither of them has any 
wind farm at all. In order for that scenario to have the structure of a prisoner’s 
dilemma, it would have to be the case that the people of each town prefer if 
both wind farms are located near the other town (Temptation). Their second 
preference would be for them to host one wind farm each (Reward), which is 
better than having no wind farm at all (Punishment). The worst case for each 
town is to have both wind farms in their vicinity while the other town has none 
(Sucker).
Each individual player has a reason to defect, as a way of minimising her 
risk of being the ‘sucker’ in the game. The best outcome for her is to defect 
while the other co-operates (Temptation). Given the awareness that this is the 
best outcome for the other player, too, ‘defecting’ will also prove safer if the 
other player chooses not to co-operate. Defecting is the dominant strategy: it 
will leave a player better off, regardless of what the other player does. N-player 
public-goods games are based on prisoner’s dilemma games in that the overall 
benefit is highest if everybody contributes, but individual benefit is highest 
if everybody else contributes except oneself. Individuals then have a reason 
to free-ride on the others’ contributions. With everybody adopting this strat-
egy, the public good is diminished to the point where no-one benefits, even 
individually.
But are NIMBYs like the ‘tempted’ player in our two-player prisoner’s 
dilemma or in an n-player public goods game? This would very much depend 
on the value they attach to the two main factors at play: the provision of RE 
and the absence of wind turbines in their vicinity. We introduced NIMBYs as 
agents whose first preference is that RE projects such as wind farms be real-
ised as long as this does not impact on their quality of living. Their preferred 
outcome, one might say, is to defect while others co-operate. This resembles 
the ‘temptation’ (T) payoff in prisoner’s dilemmas. For the strong NIMBY, 
though, the second preference would not be to co-operate (R), but to defect (P). 
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This is because the strong NIMBY attaches great value to an absence of wind 
farms in her vicinity: she prefers to defect, regardless of what others do. Let us 
assume that between the two remaining scenarios she has a preference for the 
one where all co-operate over the one where she is the only one who does. That 
is, the strong NIMBY prefers ‘reward’ (R) over ‘sucker’ (S). Their preference 
structure is: T > P > R > S. This is not the preference structure of players in a 
prisoner’s dilemma.
But would a game involving strong NIMBYs have the same dominant 
strategies as a prisoner’s dilemma? Below I have chosen exemplary payoffs 
for a game involving a strong NIMBY and a co-operative non-NIMBY with 
a sense of justice, meaning that she prefers equal contributions (R) to the two 
scenarios where only one contributes (T/S), but she is neutral between the two 
cases of unilateral contribution. To the co-operative non-NIMBY having no 
wind farm is the worst case, though. Her payoff structure is: R > T = S > P.
Table 3. Exemplary payoffs (strong NIMBY and co-operative non-NIMBY).
Non-NIMBY co-operates Non-NIMBY defects
Strong NIMBY co-operates 0/100
R/R
-50/25
S/T
Strong NIMBY defects 100/25
T/S
25/-50
P/P
If the strong NIMBY encounters such a fairness-loving impartial non-NIMBY, 
RE developments are likely to go ahead: the strong NIMBY will defect, but the 
non-NIMBY’s dominant strategy will be to co-operate (as long as she does not 
mind too much being the sucker). 
What about our weak NIMBY? In contrast to the strong NIMBY, the weak 
NIMBY prefers co-operating to having no wind farms at all (P). So she prefers 
both ‘reward’(R) and ‘sucker’ (S) to ‘punishment’ (P). Let us assume that she 
prefers the scenario where all contribute (R) to the one where only she contrib-
utes (S). We arrive at the following payoff structure for the weak NIMBY: T 
> R > S > P. This payoff structure is also different from that of the prisoners. 
The exemplary payoffs for being the sucker are still higher than those for 
‘punishment’, because even though the weak NIMBY does not want a wind 
turbine in her backyard, she prefers this to having no wind turbines at all. Here 
is what a game between the weak NIMBY and the co-operative non-NIMBY 
might look like:
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Table 4. Exemplary payoffs (weak NIMBY and co-operative non-NIMBY).
Non-NIMBY co-operates Non-NIMBY defects
Weak NIMBY co-operates 50/100
R/R
0/25
S/T
Weak NIMBY defects 100/25
T/S
-50/-50
P/P
The non-NIMBY’s dominant strategy is to co-operate, while the weak 
NIMBY does not have a dominant strategy. If she figures that the non-NIMBY 
will usually co-operate, she would usually choose to defect. Hence the likely 
outcome for this kind of conflict is the same as for the one involving strong 
NIMBYs.
Of course, it is perfectly possible that some NIMBYs have preferences 
akin to those of the prisoners, that is, that they prefer ‘punishment’ to being the 
‘sucker’. It would point out though that this prisoner-like NIMBY has mildly 
inconsistent preferences: if she really thinks that RE is important, she should 
prefer S to P. If she really thinks that justice is important, she should prefer R 
to T. Hence, I think that the weak NIMBY is more consistent than the prisoner-
like NIMBY, who likes to take advantage of others but then defects rather 
than allowing others to take advantage of her. But people do not always have 
consistent preferences and we should not exclude the third NIMBY-type. Let 
us call her the ‘ambivalent NIMBY’.
The ambivalent NIMBY is really in favour of clean energy and wind farms, 
but she also likes getting a good deal. If she had the choice between having 
wind farms in her vicinity or not, she would choose not to: T > R and T > S. 
If she must have them in her vicinity, she prefers that others make a sacrifice, 
too: R > S. If she finds herself to be the only one making a sacrifice her sense 
of injustice overpowers her desire for clean energy: P > S. Renewable energy 
– yes – but not at her cost alone:
Table 5. Preferences of the ambivalent NIMBY.
1st preference: X is built, but not in my backyard.
Ambivalent NIMBY
2nd preference: X is built in my backyard but some X is also built in someone else’s 
backyard.
3rd preference: X is not built at all.
4th preference: X is built only in my backyard. 
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In short, NIMBY payoff structures can resemble those in a prisoner’s di-
lemma, and it is possibly the ambivalent NIMBY who most resembles the 
image of the ‘selfish’ NIMBY, because she is not concerned with injustice as 
long as she benefits from it. The strong NIMBY prefers no wind farms (defec-
tion) to any scenario involving her co-operation, and the weak NIMBY prefers 
to be the sucker to having no RE at all. In a world full of strong NIMBYs and 
ambivalent NIMBYs, defection would be the dominant strategy.6 In a world 
full of weak NIMBYs, players would not have a dominant strategy, and co-
operation would be more likely.
But we must be careful not to confuse our game-theoretic analysis with 
an ethical analysis: defecting in a strategic game is not the same as acting im-
morally. Neither should we treat players’ preferences simply as a given. One 
important conclusion to take away from the discussion of NIMBYism as a stra-
tegic interaction is that if we want to successfully change outcomes, we need 
to change preferences. Further down we will discuss in more detail the moral 
implications of a refusal to host wind farms, and discuss how preferences can 
be accommodated and modified.
But regardless of whether or not NIMBYism is a kind of prisoner’s di-
lemma, are NIMBYs not aptly described as free-riders? According to Dave 
Toke, opponents to wind farm developments (and comparable projects) do not 
want to contribute to a common good that they acknowledge to be desirable 
and from which they are happy to benefit. He argues that ‘[t]here is a great 
temptation for people to act as “free riders”, continuing to consume polluting 
energy sources but making little effort to support what they may perceive to 
be clean energy sources’ (2002: 89).7 Bell et al. and Toke suggest that local 
opposition to wind farms is immoral: after all, free-riding on the contributions 
of others to a public good is unfair. Opposing wind farms (or other renewable 
energy plants) in one’s vicinity would then be a refusal to contribute to the 
public good of clean energy.
6. Here is an exemplary game between an ambivalent NIMBY and a non-NIMBY: 
Table 6. Exemplary payoffs (ambivalent NIMBY and co-operative non-NIMBY).
Non-NIMBY co-operates Non-NIMBY defects
Ambivalent NIMBY 
co-operates
50/100 
R/R
-50/25 
S/T
Ambivalent NIMBY 
defects
100/25 
T/S
0/-50 
P/P
 The ambivalent NIMBY’s dominant strategy is to defect in this game, but the non-NIMBY 
co-operates. If she were playing against another ambivalent NIMBY, both have ‘defect’ as 
their dominant strategy (just like the prisoners), and no wind farms (or other projects) would 
go ahead.
7. Crozier and Hajzler (2010) also discuss the possibility of NIMBYs being free-riders. 
ANNE SCHWENKENBECHER
718
Environmental Values 26.6
What is meant by ‘public good’ here? The literature on public goods has 
produced several definitions of them. Yet one aspect seems to be central to 
most accounts of public goods: a public good is a good that is in joint supply to 
a certain group (Cullity, 2008: 9). Economists define a pure public good as one 
satisfying two conditions: non-rivalry in, and non-exclusion from, consump-
tion. Once a public good is supplied, one person’s consumption of that good 
does not detract from another person’s consumption of the same, and one can-
not exclude others from consuming it or benefiting from it.
It is generally assumed that individuals are under some kind of moral obli-
gation to contribute their fair share to such goods, and that free-riding on other 
people’s contributions is unfair. The prototypical free-rider on public goods is 
the fare-evader, whose refusal to pay for a train ticket is seen as unfair even if 
his failure to contribute does not diminish the good in question (Cullity, 1995, 
2008).8 
But clean renewable energy is not an existing public good, because it is not 
in joint supply in any industrialised country (with the exception, perhaps, of 
Iceland9). At best, we are in the process of establishing or creating this morally 
important good. Free-riders are commonly framed as someone taking advan-
tage of an existing or established good without contributing to it. Because 
the free-rider does not normally diminish the good in question, it is difficult 
to explain what exactly is wrong with free-riding. NIMBYs, by contrast, do 
jeopardise the good in question. Protests may delay the shift to RE, or sim-
ply diminish the proportion of energy that is renewable or clean. But even if 
NIMBYs are not free-riders on a public good that is in joint supply, they could 
still be seen as (wrongfully) refusing to participate in the production of this 
desirable public good.
This is the angle from which the ‘wrongness’ of NIMBYism will be 
discussed in the next section, using the example of wind farm siting. The dis-
cussion will reveal that focusing on distributive justice alone is insufficient, 
because (some of) the burdens arising from the erection of wind farms cannot 
be justly shared or compensated. We must turn to procedural justice. 
8. A lack of partiality is not wrong per se. As Feldman ad Turner (2010: 256–260) point out, 
partiality and a lack of impartiality are not necessarily unjustifiable. According to Cullity, it 
is the lack of appropriate standards of impartiality that makes the free-rider’s actions unfair. 
Cullity’s account is compatible with the view that some partiality in one’s decisions is not 
only acceptable, but an integral part of a good life.
9. According to the 2012 Iceland Energy Statistics published by Orkustofnun, the National 
Energy Authority, one hundred per cent of Iceland’s electricity came from geothermal 
sources or hydropower. See Orkustofnun (2012).
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2. DO NIMBYS FAIL TO CONTRIBUTE THEIR SHARE?
Even if people who oppose RE developments such as wind farms in their 
vicinity do not free-ride on an existing good, their resistance still seems to 
jeopardise the production of several highly desirable public goods: a clean 
domestic energy regime, and global emissions reductions as a necessary condi-
tion for a stable climate (Diesendorf, 2010; Jamieson, 2011; Schwenkenbecher, 
2014; Shue, 2005).10
In addressing this question, I will focus on NIMBYs concerned with wind 
farms for several reasons: wind energy is a crucial component of most road-
maps for transitioning to RE, there has been significant protest around siting 
decisions, and there has been extensive research into protesters’ motivations 
and conflict-resolution strategies. Most of what will be said, however, applies 
to other RE technologies too.
From the outset, it is important to note that wind farm sites need to be 
carefully chosen, and not many locations qualify as ideal wind farm spots. 
Selecting the right location for wind farms is essential for providing high levels 
of energy security. Installing wind farms in locations where the impact on hu-
mans is minimised but efficiency is compromised imposes additional burdens 
on all, jeopardises the reliability of the energy supply, and potentially compro-
mises the aim of shifting swiftly and completely away from fossil fuels.
Costs associated with such a shift should be distributed as fairly as pos-
sible.11 But what exactly are the burdens of implementing renewable energy, 
which must be fairly distributed? Some of these are economic burdens, such 
as increased electricity prices, which affect all those connected to the grid 
(though not all of them equally). But there are also burdens that only affect 
people living in the vicinity of RE plants. 
Burdens imposed by wind farms include the audible noise generated 
by rotor blades and the visual impact that turbines have on the landscape.12 
According to the German Advisory Council on Global Change, ‘[p]rovided 
10. I am assuming it to be true that the shift to renewable energy is morally mandatory as a means 
of mitigating climate change. Immediate and comprehensive action is warranted above all 
for historical emitters and high-emission nations (see, for instance, Shue, 2011; UNEP, 2011) 
and the refusal to co-operate now is likely to be irreversible (Miller, 2011; Schwenkenbecher, 
2013). I am also assuming that achieving one hundred per cent renewable energy supply is 
achievable (Diesendorf, 2010). Expert opinions differ on the viability and capacity of the 
low-emission and zero-emission technologies that are currently available, but these differ-
ences concern merely the timeframe within which conventional energies can be completely 
replaced by low-emission and zero-emission technologies; they do not usually doubt that this 
substitution is feasible.
11. For instance, if the cost of the transition to more renewable energy is paid through a special 
‘green’ tax or through spending cuts in other sectors of the economy, caution should be taken 
to ensure that taxes are not regressive and that spending cuts do not affect mostly those who 
are already worse-off (Ekins and Dresner, 2004).
12. There is also an impact on local fauna; see, for instance, Baisner et al. (2010).
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adequate distances to settlements are maintained, noise emissions from mod-
ern wind power plants are … no longer a problem’ (WBGU, 2003: 64). In other 
words, noise pollution can easily be avoided, and will only pose a burden on 
the local population if regulations concerning minimum distances are not ob-
served. Health problems have been alleged to result from inaudible infrasound 
caused by the rotation of turbine blades; but several studies suggest that these 
allegations lack evidence, and that health problems such as the so-called ‘wind 
turbine syndrome’ are not the result of the impact of the infrasound as such 
(AGO/AWEA, 2004). Rather, it seems that the syndrome is a condition result-
ing from anxiety surrounding wind turbines (see the 2010 NHMRC study in 
Hall et al., 2012). 
One of the most profound impacts of wind farms, however, cannot be easily 
mitigated: their visual impact on the landscape. Wind farms often significantly 
alter the visual composition of their surroundings. They usually feature promi-
nently in the landscape and are visible from large distances. Cowell et al. write 
that
[i]t is undeniable that visual and landscape impacts of wind turbines greatly 
affect public responses to them, especially where they are seen as violating 
valued qualities such as openness, quietness and absence of technological struc-
tures, but there is boundless scope to dispute the significance of those impacts. 
(2012: 5)
They continue:
Wind energy facilities do create impacts that are widely seen as significant and 
adverse – even if the effects are often sensory rather than toxic. By their nature, 
wind farms can gravitate towards spaces valued for their openness. The fact 
that most governments go to great lengths to protect special landscapes (like 
National Parks) from major industrial developments like wind farms is, in some 
way, a recognition of the potential of such facilities to harm particular environ-
mental qualities. (2012: 6)
Landscape impacts constitute a burden on local stakeholders to the extent that 
they diminish or degrade something that is valuable to them. Landscapes – just 
like certain natural monuments, buildings or streetscapes – may be of cul-
tural, historical or spiritual value, holding significance for communities and 
individuals. We should therefore consider concerns about the preservation of 
particular landscapes to be legitimate concerns in principle.13 
Henceforth, I will focus on the visual or aesthetic impacts of wind farms as 
the most substantial burden they impose on local residents, because it cannot 
be mitigated and is necessarily unequally distributed. Only some communities 
13. In a similar vein, Feldman and Turner argue that NIMBYs may be expressing what they call 
geographical partiality: ‘Importantly, partiality to place is not in itself a form of selfishness, 
and it need not mean that the person’s … motivation for caring about the place is self-inter-
est’. They add that ‘NIMBY claims typically express a special concern for a particular place’ 
(2010: 256).
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will be thus affected, and it will often be those communities that are already 
at a disadvantage (see also Cowell et al., 2012: 7; and Bell et al., 2005). The 
(morally relevant) burdens resulting from visual impact cannot be other than 
unequal: by their nature they have to be carried by some and not by others. 
Should they be borne regardless? Could NIMBYs argue on the basis of unfair-
ness that they need not accept wind farms (or RE developments generally) in 
their vicinity?
Generally speaking, where something morally important is at stake, unfair-
ness in the distribution of burdens need not undermine a moral obligation. If 
coincidence puts person A rather than person B in a position to help prevent 
a morally bad outcome at some acceptable cost, then A may not refuse help 
merely because she must bear this burden unilaterally while B is ‘lucky’ to 
have no obligation to help or bear the costs. Similarly, if both A and B could 
each prevent the same bad outcome, but the required action can be performed 
by one person only, none of them may simply refuse help on the basis of 
unfairness.
The visual burdens imposed by wind farms will be borne by those liv-
ing near suitable sites, while others will be spared. But this fact alone is no 
legitimate reason to refuse to host wind farms. After all, something morally 
important is at stake: the public good of clean energy and the substitution of 
conventional fossil-fuel-based energy technologies with renewable energy 
technologies.14 An agent who unilaterally provides help, however, may often 
qualify for compensation of the loss suffered. Similarly, wind-farm communi-
ties may qualify for compensation from the remaining communities, even more 
so since the latter will benefit from clean energy generated by wind farms.15 I 
will come back to this point in a moment. 
According to Maarteen Wolsink, NIMBYs regularly appeal to fairness- or 
justice-related reasons: 
Local opposition cannot be explained by the egotistical motives of local 
residents. When the inclination to behave according to (supposed) backyard 
motives is investigated, the scale to measure this phenomenon appears to in-
dicate commitment to equity issues and fairness of decision-making. Hence, 
for wind power, local involvement to represent the local values of site-specific 
landscapes is crucial. For other renewables the source-specific features are 
different, but conflicts can be expected as well because the fairness of imple-
mentation decisions will be equally significant. (2007: 2692)
14. Sometimes the failure of a key RE project can be in an important sense irreversible: it can lock 
in fossil-fuel-based energy technology for decades to come, making it ever harder to shift to 
renewables. Similarly, some of the other effects of slowing down the shift to renewables are 
irreversible. A delayed shift will mean a greater total amount of harmful emissions, as well as 
of local co-pollution associated with conventional fossil-fuel-based energy generation.
15. This is assuming that the benefits of clean energy will be available to all.
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Wolsink argues that NIMBYs often view themselves as victims of an injustice;16 
they have to carry a disproportionate share of a burden that decision-makers 
have shifted onto them without consultation. They argue that they should be 
engaged in planning decisions that will impact on their lives and well-being. 
Is their refusal to contribute to the common good a refusal to endure unfair-
ness for the sake of what is overall morally mandatory? If so, it seems that 
where communities are granted economic compensation for the visual impacts 
of wind farms (or where these burdens are mitigated or minimised), they are no 
longer justified in refusing to accept them in their vicinity. Or are they?
It is important to qualify this claim in two ways. First, it depends on the 
level of burden imposed on such communities, and the nature of their refusal 
to allow wind farms in their vicinity. In some cases, the aim of one’s refusal 
to co-operate in the production of a common good is to enforce standards of 
fairness; in others, it is a categorical refusal. A categorical refusal may be justi-
fied for a community that lives off tourism, as the integrity of the surrounding 
natural landscape is essential to its economic wellbeing. Second, it is not clear 
that all burdens can be compensated. When Cowell et al. write that, where pos-
sible, local communities should be compensated for the loss of ‘environmental 
qualities that people might otherwise have expected to keep’ (2012: 12), the 
question arises: to what extent it is even possible to compensate the loss of 
environmental qualities such as negative visual impacts on valued landscapes? 
Without claiming that all – or even most – NIMBYs are concerned with land-
scape values, the fact that protests can be about the loss of landscapes reveals a 
difficulty of the compensation approach, and, in fact, of the distributive justice 
approach as such.
In approaching NIMBYism as a problem of distributive justice – as protests 
against an unequal distribution of costs and burdens – compensation schemes 
appear to be the obvious solution. This perspective, however, may (partially) 
miss the point. When an object is irreplaceable, it is not possible to fully com-
pensate people for its loss (see, for instance, Goodin, 1989: 73). Landscapes, in 
fact, are irreplaceable. If Bell et al. (2005) and Wolsink (2007) are correct, then 
concerns about the preservation of a particular landscape are at the heart of 
many protests against projects like wind farms. Often, people do not want to be 
compensated for the loss of a valued landscape, rather they want to preserve it. 
This reveals a completely new dimension of the problem discussed here. While 
economic disadvantages can be compensated, loss of landscapes possibly can-
not. Are preservation concerns sometimes incompatible with the obligation to 
shift to clean energy? And if so, how should we reconcile them?
16. Whether their complaints are legitimate would depend on several factors, including on 
whether or not affected communities are already disadvantaged. Economically disadvan-
taged communities are more vulnerable and are therefore often targeted as potential sites for 
wind farms and other schemes (Bell et al., 2005: 473). Ironically, more affluent communities 
are usually better equipped for effectively opposing such schemes than less affluent ones (see 
also Feldman and Turner, 2010: 263ff.).
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One way to account for such concerns is simply to stipulate the overriding 
importance of shifting to RE: if impacts on valued landscapes are the only way 
of achieving the shift, then some of us will just have to bite the bullet. But per-
haps there are other ways to address potential conflicts between both concerns. 
Bell et al. have argued that ‘there is no “technical fix” for the problem of land-
scape impact’, and that ‘[i]nstead, the only way of accommodating people’s 
landscape concerns is to site wind farms in places that people find more accept-
able’ (2005: 470). They suggest that we need to approach the problem as one 
of procedural justice. In the following section, I show that we need procedures 
that allow for non-standard decision-making.
3. MORE THAN A MATTER OF DISTRIBUTION?
How should landscape values figure in decision-making about the siting of 
wind farms? In this section, I argue that we have to abandon the idea of ranking 
and trading off competing concerns. Rather than merely engaging stakeholders 
in a process where they can express their (pre-conceived) set of preferences and 
include those preferences in siting decisions, we should start thinking about 
community engagement as a process that permits preferences to be formed and 
adjusted. As I will explain further down, non-traditional accounts of rational 
choice may be best suited to solving the kind of conflicts in question. 
The standard way to solve conflicts of competing concerns (and obliga-
tions) is to trade off one concern against the other, thus establishing which 
concern is in relative terms more important: for instance, that of transitioning 
to renewable energy, or that of preserving a particular landscape valuable to 
a particular group of NIMBYs. The trade-off approach compares and ranks 
the options available. This does not mean that the landscape concerns will go 
unheard; the ranking can account for them:
Table 7. Ranking of concerns.17
Best option: RE is implemented and valued landscapes are preserved.18
Second-best option: RE is implemented without the preservation of valued landscapes.
Third-best option: RE is not implemented and valued landscapes are preserved.
17. According to Claire Haggett (2010: 314), it is important to distinguish between NIMBYs, 
who are concerned with impacts on their place of residence and therefore face a personal 
sacrifice, and protesters, who want to preserve far-away landscapes. Feldman and Turner, 
however, are quite right to point out that ‘one can have NIMBY style preference rankings 
with respect to places that are far from one’s current home’ (2014: 107). I would add that in-
dividual well-being may well be impacted by the destruction of valued far-away landscapes.
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The underlying assumption of this approach is that there is a single umpiring 
principle or priority-rule, which establishes how options rank in comparison. If 
a transition to RE is significantly more important than landscape concerns, the 
former will trump the latter whenever a choice must be made between these 
two. But is the former more important than the latter in every single instance? 
Or is there something wrong with this approach as such?
The immediate worry is that landscape concerns can easily be construed as 
detrimental to RE implementation. Efforts to preserve landscapes will usually 
impose (additional) costs on the process of RE implementation: for example, 
the cost of having to find an alternative – equally suitable – location, or the 
cost of constructing a wind farm in a less suitable location where it generates 
less energy or does so less reliably. Assuming that implementing RE is not 
only morally important but also urgent, such costs can almost always be un-
derstood as undermining the aim of a timely implementation of RE. The worry 
is that in this trade-off, landscape concerns are likely to lose out against RE 
developments in most cases. Clearly, the good done by a shift to clean energy, 
and the mitigation of dangerous climate change, outweighs the importance of 
individual landscapes. Or does it?
Several authors have criticised the trade-off approach to environmental 
decision-making arguing that it wrongly assumes value commensurability (see 
O’Neill, 1998; O’Neill et al., 2008). They maintain that the values attached to 
landscapes and our natural environments may be incommensurable with the 
values promoted by renewable energies, including those values that climate 
change mitigation helps us protect. They have argued that the expression of 
concerns for valued landscapes in the form of NIMBYism may sometimes 
constitute an instance of resisting the logic of commensurability.18 
O’Neill has argued that ‘the major source of assumption of commensu-
rability in economics lies in the supposition that the rational resolution of 
practical conflicts requires a common measure through which different options 
can be compared’ (1998: 122). He not only thinks that practical conflict can 
be solved without such a common measure, but also argues that contemporary 
accounts of cost-benefit analysis make a mistake in assuming that there must 
exist one method for solving any practical conflict if such conflict-solving is 
to be rational. O’Neill argues that rationality does not require a single gen-
eral umpiring rule;19 instead of commensurability, all that is needed is a weak 
18. In a similar vein, Martin Drenthen argues that ‘[m]any NIMBY protests cannot be solely 
seen as attempts by local inhabitants to promote their interests and preference in the political 
arena. The more radical issue is another: whether the place at stake in all its particularity is 
a particularly valuable, meaningful place, not to be compared to or replaced by other places’ 
(2010: 323).
19. To say that it does, involves an invalid shift in the scope of a quantifier (O’Neill, 1998: 123):
UE. For any putative practical conflict, rationality requires that there be a way of resolving 
the conflict.
However, it does not follow that a single general umpiring rule is required:
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comparability of goods.20 This means that even if some values are incommen-
surable, we can still arrive at solutions to value-conflicts. The idea is that it 
is precisely the exercise of practical judgement in particular contexts which 
helps us resolve such conflicts. The way we resolve them, though, may not 
be transferable from one context to another. Importantly, we need not make 
a judgement of the form that one consideration is always more important and 
overrides another consideration. In different contexts, values may have more 
or less weight, depending on the circumstances.
So how should we decide between competing moral imperatives? Let us 
have a look at the following example: Assume that we must choose between 
three different wind farm sites A, B and C, which have different strengths:
• Mitigation and clean energy impact: The site’s energy capacity and 
as a result the extent to which it contributes to substituting fossil fuel 
based energy generation; 
•	 Efficiency: The forecast energy output in relation to construction and 
running cost; and
• Landscape impact. 
Table 8. Competing moral imperatives.
Location Mitigation impact Efficiency Landscape impact
A 1st 2nd 3rd
B 2nd 3rd 1st
C 3rd 1st 2nd
• It is rational to prefer A over B, because A has the biggest mitigation 
impact and is more cost efficient than B;
• It is rational to prefer B over C, because B’s impact on the landscape is 
smaller and it has a higher mitigation impact;
• It is rational to prefer C over A, because C is more efficient than A and 
has a less severe impact on the landscape.
EU. Rationality requires there be a method such that for any practical conflict the method 
resolves the conflict (ibid.: 123).
The inference from UE to EU involves a shift in the scope of the quantifiers from 
UE. ∀c$m Rmc 
to
EU. $m∀c Rmc. 
20. O’Neill defines ‘weak comparability’ like this: ‘at any time t in context c given a putative 
practical conflict of goods there is a way of comparing the different goods to arrive at an 
outcome that resolves the conflict … We exercise practical judgement in a particular context 
to resolve conflicts between different values which present different standards and measures 
of value’ (1998: 124).
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If equal weight is assigned to all three considerations, then these preferences 
will be intransitive without any failure of rationality. In order to come to a deci-
sion, we must rank the options. According to O’Neill, this need not be a ranking 
of values valid for all possible conflicts and which can resolve the conflict in 
advance (1993: 113). Rather, the weight given to the different considerations is 
specific to that context and conflict. What would this mean if applied to wind 
farm cases? Should affected residents simply decide in each particular case 
which of these values is most important to them? But then would NIMBYS 
not always argue that landscape is the most important concern, and therewith 
jeopardise a shift away from fossil fuels or even end up with highly inefficient 
(and thus expensive) wind farms, as in option B above? How can we decide 
what to do when both are in conflict?
The first lesson to take away from O’Neill is that the relative importance of 
competing concerns can be decided on a case-by-case basis. The second lesson 
is that we need to abstain from adopting substantive overriding principles or 
values when assessing the outcome. The rational choice where claims compete 
need not be the best outcome given existing preferences or values. 
Non-substantive accounts of rational decision-making – including proce-
dural, expressive and narrative accounts of rationality – may solve this kind 
of problem, because they do not define rational choice in terms of the best 
outcome. According to procedural accounts of practical reason, an action is 
rational if it is an outcome of a rational procedure, for example when it is 
the outcome of appropriate deliberation.21 Preferences are ‘formed and trans-
formed through reasoned dialogue between free and equal citizens’ (O’Neill, 
2007: 13). O’Neill et al. suggest that environmental decisions should be made 
in a way that is procedurally rational, rather than substantively rational, to ac-
count for plural and incommensurable values (2008: 205).22
According to expressive accounts, actions are rational where they express 
the agent’s evaluations of objects and persons. The idea is that ‘[a]ctions are 
not just instrumental means to an end, but a way of expressing attitudes to 
people and things’ (O’Neill, 1998: 126). Consequently, to act rationally means 
to express one’s evaluations, to express the relative importance we attach to 
the things evaluated.
Narrative accounts of rational choice go one step further in emphasis-
ing that choices in human lives ‘are a matter of deciding not simply some 
21. O’Neill argues that ‘[r]ational behaviour is that which emerges from deliberation that meets 
the norms of rational discussion. Given a procedural account of rationality, what matters is 
the development of deliberative institutions that allow citizens to form preferences through 
reasoned dialogue, not institutions for aggregating given preferences to arrive at an “optimal” 
outcome’ (1998: 126).
22. O’Neill et al. (2008: 204) compare procedural accounts to substantive accounts of rational 
choice (decision-making as the result of aggregating the existing preferences of citizens), and 
argue that in the presence of plural and incommensurable values, the former present a better 
way of rational decision-making.
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maximisation of valued items, but of how the story of a life of a person or 
community should continue’ (O’Neill, 1993: 127). Situations in which values 
conflict and in which we nevertheless must decide between two courses of ac-
tion can change us as agents forever (Raz, 1986: 339–340). Hence the choice 
that we make does not so much reflect who we are and what values we hold, 
but who we want to be or will be.
Let us now return to the problem of NIMBYism and practical decision-
making under the assumption of value-incommensurability. Adopting 
non-substantive accounts of rationality in order to solve the conflict in question 
would involve allowing for the right kind of deliberation, in the process giving 
stakeholders the opportunity to adjust or change their values, or simply to ex-
press them, or else to choose a certain narrative over another. Decision-making 
is then ‘not a matter of calibrating losses and gains on various values according 
to some measure, and then deciding which produces the highest total value. It 
is rather a matter of attending to different reasons and forming a judgement 
through the process of deliberation’ (O’Neill et al., 2008: 205). 
Such a process may be applied to all relevant considerations (for example: 
mitigation impact, landscape impact or efficiency), or only to some. If such an 
approach is adopted in the decision-making process, the conflict may or may 
not be resolved in favour of the threatened landscape.
But this might make RE advocates nervous. They could argue that for local 
stakeholders it may seem that landscapes should take priority in most cases, 
but from a national and global perspective, the necessity to shift to clean en-
ergy and to mitigate climate change clearly overrides such concerns (especially 
given that valued landscapes would be threatened by climate change too). We 
seem to be faced with a similar worry to the one with which we started: that 
which is individually rational and that which is collectively rational simply 
differ.
One possible solution is to argue that the collective rationale should 
outweigh the individual one in one regard: ‘mitigation impact’ must be the 
overriding concerns in such decisions, but the relative importance of the re-
maining criteria (efficiency and landscape value) is to be determined for each 
individual case by non-substantive rational decision-making.23 But this would 
perhaps not satisfy NIMBYs: in some cases, it seems that mitigation and 
23. Here is an example for limiting the use of non-substantive rational choice in siting decisions. 
If mitigation impact was the most important consideration, and if several sites had the same 
mitigation impact, we could allow for the relative importance of efficiency considerations 
and landscape impact to be decided in a non-standard way:
Table 9. Competing moral imperatives.
Location Mitigation impact Efficiency Landscape impact
D 1st 2nd 3rd
E 1st 3rd 2nd
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clean-energy concerns should not trump landscape preservation. Is there no 
better solution then?
There is at least some reason to think that we actually can (or perhaps 
even must) have both: plural (incommensurable) values, and a shift to RE. And 
here is how: several authors suggest that engaging local stakeholders regu-
larly changes their attitudes towards RE projects (Cowell et al., 2011; Murphy, 
2010; Warren and McFadyen, 2010). Catherine Gross (2007) finds that people 
are more accepting of siting decisions if they perceive the process leading to 
the decision as fair. People’s concerns regarding landscape impacts of wind 
turbines can be addressed directly via extensive community consulting on tur-
bine placement during which important viewpoints should be agreed with the 
community early in the process (AGO/AWEA, 2004; AWEA/ACNT, 2007). 
Moving beyond mere consultation of stakeholders, community ownership 
has been shown to have a significant positive impact on the acceptance of 
wind farms, essentially giving communities control over the process (Murphy, 
2010). But what is perhaps more surprising is that, according to Warren and 
McFadyen (2010), where communities and individuals have been engaged in 
the decision-making process and where they financially benefit from them, 
local residents perceive wind farms as positive, including their visual impact 
on the landscape.
In short, empirical evidence seems to suggest that stakeholder engagement 
and procedures that allow for non-standard decision-making will eventually 
play in favour of a shift to renewables. It seems that people are just not that 
concerned with wind farms if they consider them ‘their own’ project. Not only 
can community consultation ensure that wind turbines are erected where they 
least disturb local residents, but it seems that if locals become decision-makers 
or even co-owners, they find them less aesthetically objectionable. The practi-
cal conflict between conservation and mitigation concerns therefore seems – at 
least in principle – resolvable. To the extent that values change during such 
processes, the theoretical conflict as to which concern is morally weightier will 
be resolved, too.
The more general conclusion for controversial infrastructure projects 
seems to be that community consulting should not be seen merely as a tool for 
increasing the sense of fairness, or for finding ways to distribute benefits and 
burdens as justly as possible, but as a way of allowing people to adjust, or else 
develop, their collective and individual preferences and beliefs, and to take 
control over the process. 
4. CONCLUSION
To conclude, let me return to our initial question: what is wrong with NIMBYs? 
This article suggests that sometimes there is nothing wrong with them at all. 
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NIMBYs may be expressing concerns for a particular landscape which they 
value, and on which they may sometimes legitimately refuse to put a price tag. 
Their refusal to co-operate in the transition to renewable energy may reflect 
both a lack of procedural and distributive justice. Acknowledging that at least 
some of these tensions arise from true conflicts of value might help us to bet-
ter understand NIMBYism and, in fact, give us a better idea of how we might 
possibly overcome it. In both cases – the resistance against unjust distribution 
of burdens, and the resistance against landscape alterations – successful re-
sponses will seek to involve affected local populations in the decision-making 
process.
What I have not argued, however, is that all – or even a particularly large 
number of – NIMBY claims are legitimate in the way described above; 
only that, in principle, they can be. Even the less legitimate NIMBY claims, 
however, are likely to be more successfully addressed by way of providing eco-
nomic incentives to communities and involving them in the decision-making 
process. In fact, because local resistance to renewable energy developments 
delays emission reductions and prevents countries from complying with cli-
mate change mitigation duties, both prudential and moral reasons speak in 
favour of seeking the dialogue with concerned stakeholders.
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